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It is now generally recognized that the flow of marketed surplus
of foodgrains is one of the crucial limiting factors in the process of
industrialization, particularly in those developing economies where
export prospects are not very bright and where the need for large imports
of capital goods and intermediate products leave little scope for
commercial import of foodgrains. It is, therefore, important to under-
stand how marketed surplus of foodgrains responds to changes in production,
prices and other relevant variables. For example, the nature of output
response of the marketed proportion of foodgrains output would indicate
if the problem of marketed surplus becomes more acute or less as
agricultural production increases over time; similarly, the nature of
price response would indicate the possible impact of different kinds of
food price regulations or distribution of imports of food under U.S.
Public Law 480 (an oft-debated issue) on the marketed surplus and
suggest suitable price policies if the aim of the Government is to
increase such surplus in order to feed the industrial population. In
spite of the general agreement on the importance of the subject, the
literature on empirical estimates of the response coefficients of
marketed surplus of foodgrains is still very small. The major reason
2for this, of course, is that available data on sales or marketed surplus
of foodgrains in most underdeveloped countries are less adequate and
satisfactory than most other kinds of agricultural statistics. In view
of the lack of time series data for marketed amounts, there have been
some studies1 estimating the price response of marketed surplus through
an indirect, and overly aggregative, approach. These estimates are,
in general, derived on the basis of the estimated income and price
elasticities of demand for foodgrains for the agricultural sector as
a whole, the supply elasticity of grain production to current price
changes (or expected prices as related to current prices) and a production
adjustment lag when changes over time are implied. Because of the
indirect nature of the estimates and depending on the approximation
assumptions made about the price response of production and time lag
of response, the likely magnitude and even the sign of the price elasticity
of marketed surplus is still debatable. Besides, from a study of the
available sources it seems that the imperfections of the data become
less serious as one gets down to more disaggregate levels; and because
of significant lack of regional uniformity within a country a dis-
aggregative study is probably more meaningful for policy implications.
In view of all this, we have attempted in this paper a cross-sectional2
See Raj Krishan [7], Krishnan [5], Behrman [2].
2Raj Krishna [8] has alos studied the behaviour of marketed
surplus with changes in the size of holding, the level of grain production
or farm income fro cross-sections of cultivating households in selected
villages. This approach has been extended to the aggregate national level
by Dharm Narain [3] who indirectly derived the distribution of marketed
(footnote continued on next page)
3(inter-village) study for a set of several North-Indian villagesestimating
the response of marketed surplus to variations in average output and
price of foodgrains and also to some other possible relevant variables,
particularly income of farmers from sources other than foodgrain
production.
I
Data:
From the socio-economic surveys of villages carried out by the
Agricultural Economics Research Centre at University of Delhi we
collected data - for twenty seven villages of Punjab and Uttar Pradesh -
relating to the marketed proportion of foodgrain production and some
of the major economic factors that might influence it. These are
described in Appendix Table A.l.
Each observation in Table A.1 relates to all the cultivators (owner,
tenant, and mixed) in a village put together. The dependent (Y) and
the explanatory variables (X's) are defined as follows:
Y: Total amount of foodgrains (cereals and pulses sold by the
cultivators in a village as percentage of production of food-
grains; figures used for both sales and production are in
surplus according to size-classes of operational holdings in India
in 1950-51. In both cases, either the impact of independent
variables other than output is presumed unimportant or the
objective is to find out the net outcome of the effects of
these variables on marketed surplus for size-classes of
holdings.
4quantity terms (maunds) that are equivalents of 82.3 lbs.)
X1: Foodgrain production (in maunds) per adult unit of the cultivating
population of the village. Per adult unit rather than total
amount is considered in order to take account of inter-village
differences in size and age-sex composition of the cultivating
population. Adult unites are obtained by applying a conversion
ratio based on the age and sex structure of the population
of the village concerned. A minor (less than or equal to 15
years) is taken as equivalent to 0.8 unit and an adult female
to 0.9 unit as far as grain consumption is concerned.
X2: Average price (rupees per maund) at which foodgrains were sold
by the cultivators in a village. The village surveys do not
quote any market prices as such, but give only the quantities
and the values of sales and production of foodgrains. The
average 'sale price' (X2) is derived from dividing the value
of total foodgrain sale by the quantity sold. The appropriate-
ness of using this price for explaining cultivators' marketing
decisions may be questioned in a situation where a number of
foodgrains are raised during any year, none being of overwhelming
importance, and the proportion sold is not the same for
different grains in different years or in different villages.
This is the case in North-West India as distinct from the
cases of the rice-growing South and East. In this case, a
better index of the average grain price that influences marketing
5decisions would probably be one in which the weights used for
prices of the different food-rains relate to the volumes of
their production rather than their sales. This would be the
average price derived from dividing the total value of production
of foodgrains by the total volume. We have used both the
indexes, and it so happens that in the particular sample they
do not make much difference to the results.
X3: Value of production of commercial crops other than foodgrains
defined as per adult unit of the cultivating population in a
village
X 4 : Average income of cultivators from sources boier than the
production of crops. Over most parts of Punjab and Uttar
Pradesh, livestock products (milk and ghee) form the most
important source of income for the cultivators outside the
production of crops. Hence X in our model stands for the
value of production of milk (and its products) per adult
unit of the cultivating population.
X5: Index of concentration of cultivated acreage in a village.
Cultivating households and cultivated area in a village are
classified into three size-groups: up to 5 acres, 5 to 15,
15 acres and above. The concentration index is then obtained
by summing the differences between the cumulated percentages
of households and of cultivated area in each size class, and
dividing the sum by 100. The larger the difference between
6the percentage of households and the percentage of area in
each size class the larger is the index. When the proportion
of households in each size class equals the proportion of area
in the corresponding size class, the index assumes a value of
zero. With rise in concentration of area in upper size classes,
the index goes up, the maximum limit being unity.
X6: Other disposals of foodgrains (i.e., other than sales) minus
other receipts of foodgrains (i.e., other than what is produced
on the farm) as proportion of foodgrain production. These other
disposals consist of rent and wage payments in kind. Some of
these disposals may be mutual payments among the cultivators
themselves. To exclude these mutual payments and to obtain the
net disposals of foodgrains by the cultivators as a group to
the pure rent receivers and the agricultural labourers, we have
subtracted the sum of 'other receipts' of foodgrains for the
cultivators from the sum of 'other disposals' of grains.
Theoretically Expected Signs of Response Cpefficients
Let the marketed surplus equation for an individual cultivator
or a group of cultivators be
S = 0 - C - N Ct)
where the respective terms are sales, production, consumption and net
7other disposal (i.e. payments in kind minus receipts in kind) of foodgrains.
Lt us assume, for the sake of simplicity, the basket of consumption
goods purchased by the cultivator to be the numeraire good and its
price to be unity. Then from equation I,
S f(0 )Pf)
s = = 1 - 0 - n (II)0 f0ff f
where his total income is 0 = P O0 + Pc'c + m'Om Pf being foodgrain
price, Pc0c being the value of production of crops other than foodgrains,
P 0 being the value of production of milk and milk products (which
constitute the main source of income outside crop production for the
North Indian cultivator), and n is net other disposal of foodgrains as
a proportion of output.
From equation: II,
as C P 0
= 2(1-e. -),(I)
f 0 0
e denoting the cultivator's income elasticity of demand for foodgrains.
Similarly,
= (-e + 0), (IV)
f f f
a being the cultivator's price elasticity of demand for foodgrains
defined as positive.
8For India as a whole, with e = 0.6 to 0.8 3, a = 0.2 to 0.50
and P 0 /0 = 0.5 to 0.55 5, which are plausible ranges of values for
fY
India, the output response of marketed surplus (i.e., -L, in terms of
the notation used in our Tables) is almost invariably non-negative.
And the price response coefficient (DY/3X 2 in terms of our Tables)
may or may not be negative. But the likelihood of obtaining a negative
coefficient rises as e and/or P 0 /0 tend to have larger values within
the assumed range and/or as a tends to have smaller values. Considering
@Y ay
the dependence of 0 on P 0 (X ) and P 0 (X ), and -- from equation
c c 3 m m 4 3X3  3X4
II may be expected to be negative.
From Equation II it also seems that aY/3X 6 i4likely to be negative
since 3s/3n < 0. Between two villages or cultivators with similar
production condition, a larger volume of net disposal other than sales
may arise from any of the following: (a) if the proportion of total
cost (wages, rent and others) that is paid in kind Is larger, which may
be due to institutional reasons, (b) if total paid-out cost itself is
3
Based on expenditure elasticities of demand for foodgrains in
the rural sector estimated from different rounds of NSS data, and an
income elasticity of expenditure assumed to be 0.95 for the rural
sector.
4Based on estimates by Barpujari and Chandra [1] and Krishnan [4].
5
Value of foodgrain production as percentage of total value
of output of all crops and their byproducts was 53.8 in 1960-61
according to the calculations of National Council of Applied
Economic Research [6]. The proportion was slightly smaller than this
during the First Plan Period.
9larger (which may arise from a larger ratio of leased in to cultivated
area, larger employment of labour, or higher rates of rent and wage),
(c) if more of the purchased consumption goods and services are obtained
through direct barter. In case (c) this 'other disposal' constitutes
a part of the marketable surplus, so that even with unchanged output
and marketable surplus of grains, the quantity actually marketed will
vary inversely with net other disposal. In case (b), net grain
production, X1(1-X6 ), and hence cultivator's real income would be
smaller where this other disposal is larger; and this would reduce
the marketed surplus out of the given gross production provided the
cultivator's marginal propensity to consume foodgrain is smaller than
unity. In case (a), changes in other disposal would inversely change
the marketed proportion of total marketable surplus and of production;
a larger proportion of cash payment of costs would lead to larger sales,
a part of which may eventually be bought back from the village market
by the payee.
The response of marketed proportion of production to X i.e. the
degree of concentration in the distribution of land (as a proxy for the
distribution or production) among different size-classes, is likely to
be positive as long as the response of the marketed proportion to change
in production is positivie and if larger-sized holdings are associated
with larger levels of grain output per consuming unit.
The theoretically expected signs need not always be statistically
obtained, because of at least two factors: (a) some factors other than
10
those covered by the independent variables considered may have some
bearing on the dependent variable, and (b) two or more of the variables
taken account of may be related to a third common factor left out which
may cause disturbances in the regression estimates.
Notes on Villages:
With these a priori comments about the nature of dependence of
marketed proportionof production on the variable under consideration,
we may now turn to analyse the inter-village observations presented in
Table A.l. As noted in the Table, the reference year is not the same
for- the different observations, though most of them cluster within the
Second Plan period - a period during which the effects of Bhakra Nangal
irrigation and of consolidation of holdings were being felt widely in
rural Punjab. The non-uniformity of reference year need not make an
inter-village analysis of marketed surplus impossible. By including
some of the major structural factors among the explanatory variables,
one can take care of most of the effect of differences in reference
year on the dependent variable. In an analagous way it can be argue-
that if for the same village the values assumed by the dependent and/or
by some of the explanatory variables are found to be different as between
two points of time separated by a few years, then they may be treated as
constituting practically two different observations for the purpose of
the inter-village regression analysis. Village Sohalpur Gara, for
example, was enormously different in 1958-59 (when the resurvey was made)
11
from 1954-55 (year of the initial survey) as a result of the setting
up of a sugar mill only over amile away, and the construction of a
road connecting the village with the mill and of two large tubewells
that irrigated 68% of the cultivated area where previously there was
little irrigation. In an important economic sense the two surveys
give us two distinct cases. In the following regression analysis we
have first included both of the double point surveys for the villages
surveyed twice, and then excluded one of them from the sample. This
change in the sample produces little striking difference in the results -
which, incidentally, justifies the above argument.
Though confined mainly to one region of the country, the selected
villages present quite a varied cross-section of economic conditions.
Village Lodi Nangal, for example, is electrified, has almost 100% of
its cultivated area under irrigation; most of its cultivators keep
milch cattle to meet the demand of a government dairy only 15 miles
away. The Ferozepur villages have large-sized operated holdings in many
of which improved implements, including tractors, are used for wheat
cultivation. These villages are in striking contrast to some villages
from Uttar Pradesh,like village Palanpur which has very poor soil
subject to recurrent floods and small-sized holdings cultivated with
backward techniques. As for the size-distribution of cultivated area,
in village Dughri only 3 of the 53 cultivating households had holdings
equal to or smaller than 5 acres; in Koloyee, on the other hand, about
half of the cultivators belonged to this size-class. Operational
12
holdings in the size-group of '15 acres and above' accounted for 10%
or less of all holdings and for 30% or less than all cultivated area in
Bjohpur, Dhakia, Mehtiana, Rawatpur and Palanpur ; on the other
that this size-class accounted for more than 60Y of holdings and more than
80% of cultivated area in Sarai Naga, Patran, Lodi Nangal, and nearly
also Rataul Rohe.
There are substantial differences even among villages within
the same district and for the same village between two surveys.
Results
As indicated in Table 1 (Regression (a) to (d)), the linear
regression estimates of marketed proportion of production on grain
production are positive and significant, and on grain price negative and
significant throughout. The reamining regression coefficients are of
the expected sign except that of Y on X3 which turns out to be positive
though statistically insignificant. The variables with statistically
significant influence on marketed proportion of production in the sample
of villages are the average production and price of foodgrains, and in
some cases also the average income from milk production in a village
and net disposal of foodgrain other than through sales as a proportion
of production.
Two aspects of these results seem to be rather important. One
is that the volume of marketed surplus is a quadratic function (with
positive second derivative) of the average level of foodgrain production,
TABLE 1: Marketed Surplus Function: Regression Coefficients for a Cross-section of North Indian Villages
Sample Elasticity
X X or X '1 2 2 X 3 X 4 X 5 X 
Degrees
6 of A
(a) All 31 cases
or Table A.1, with
X2
24.913* 1.293* -1.351 .068 -4.683 9.549 -. 097 24 .821* .788 -. 575
(b) Same as (a), but 29.887*
with X2
(c) 27 cases, exclud- 28.814*
ing one of each double
point surveys and with
1.176* -1.641* .738 -4.147 7.514 -.083
1.265* -1.447* .527 -8.U7* 7.021 -. 048
24 .840* .717 -.738
20 .832* .774 -.599
(d) Same as (c),
but with X2
(e) All 27 cases of
Table A.2 with X'
(f) Same as (e),
but with X2
(g) 22 Cases of
Table A.2, using
criterion(ii) and
with Xt
2
(h) same as (g),
but with X2
(i) 19 cases of Table
A.2, using criterion
(iii) and with X'
(j) Same as (i)
but with X2
31.308* 1.168* -1.632* 1.145 -7.343** 5.699 -.013
32. 740*
36. 000*
58.842*
.808* -.926*** .234
.796* -1.245*** .554
.574* -1.273***-1.098
58.655* .587** -1.359***--.828
48.656* .727* -.840 -.868
47.627* .723* -.615 -.969
-4.350***
-4.184
-3.608
-3.692
-7.430***
-7.396***
-. 242
-. 233
-. 907*
-. 863*
-. 514
-. 560
20 .847*
21 .683*
21 .690*
.719 -. 712
.595 -. 330
.585 -. 464
16 .728* .432 -.448
16 .727*
13 .672*
13 .662*
.442 -. 498
.578
.574
* significant at 1-5 percent level, ** significant at
Source: Tables A.1 and A.2
5-10 percent level, *** significant at 10-25 percent level
Constant
Term
of Y
X
to:
re om %_
X2R
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as indicated by the significantly positive regression coefficient of
the marketed proportion of production on production itself. This is
analogous to the time-series case of the marginal propensity to sell
foodgrain rising with its production. From Table 1, the output elasticity
of the marketed proportion of output is between .5 to .8, and the
corresponding output elasticity of amount marketed is between 1.5 to
1.8. We may note from our Equation (III) that for the output elasticity
of marketed surplus to be more than unity a sufficient condition is
that cultivators' income elasticity of demand for foodgrains be less
than (or equal to) unity.
The other important observation relates to the negative sign of the
price response of marketed surplus as a proportion of production (and
also in absolute terms 6). For our sample of villages, the estimated
value of the elasticity is -.45 to -.71 from Table 1. As is apparent
from Table 1, this negative response of marketed surplus to changes in
foodgrain price is net of the effect of changes in the price-ratio
between foodgrain and other crops (which affects variable X 3, with
given X2 ) or, more generally speaking, it is net of the effect of
changes in cultivators' income from sources other than foodgrain production
(X3 and X 4).
6For the sample of cases in Table A.1 we noted that average grain
price (Pf) and production of grains (Of) are not significantly correlated
(the coefficient of correlation is less than 0.1 in absolute value).
This means that the result of 3(S/O f)/Pf being negative implies
aS/aPf also to be negative.
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A change in grain price affects marketed surplus both directly and
through its effect on the cultivator's income. The consistently negative
price elasticity of marketed surplus thus implies, for this cross-
section of villages at least, that the rise in income generated,
ceteris paribus, by larger grain price leads to a rise in demand for
retention of foodgrains large enough to outweigh the negative substitu-
tion effect on consumption. This negative price response suggests the
possibility that a fall in grains price due to food price regulations
or imports may not have an adverse effect on marketed surplus of farmers,
contrary to what is sometimes taken for granted. As long as income
elasticity of demand for foodgrains remains large in the agricultural
sector, this possibility should not be ignored. In this connection it
may be worthwhile to find out if the price response coefficient is
negative even in the case of a subset of richer cultivators whose income
elasticity of demand for foodgrains is likely to be smaller. For this
purpose we have carried out some additional estimates of output, price
and other response coefficients for the "richer" sub-samples.
In doing this we immediately face the complicated problem of
defining 'better-off' cultivators with specific reference to the
villages under consideration. We have used three rough - but not very
unreasonable - criteria which are discussed in more detail in the note
to Table A.2. These are: (i) grouping together - for each village -
7This retention includes that for livestock feeding the income
elasticity for' which may be fairly high in view of the importance of
milk and milk products for many of these villages.
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only the cultivators with operational holdings of 10 acres and above
(this gives us the 27 cases described in Table A.2); (ii) out of these
27, selecting only the cases (22) for which a 10 acre holding yields
an annual income (net of paid costs of cultivation - see note to Table
A.3) worth at least about Rs. 1000 which may be regarded as above the
subsistence minimum for the period under consideration; (iii) in order
to study the marketing behaviour of cultivators who are better-off
not only in terms of total farm income but also in terms of grain production,
we have picked out 19 cases out of the 22 from (ii) 4uch that in each
the level of grain production per adult unit for the larger cultivators
(with more than 10 acres) is not less than 15 maunds in a year8 (i.e.
not less than 100 pounds per month).
Comparing regressions (e) - (j) with the results obtained from the
earlier, more general sample (regressions (a) - (d)), one finds that
the marketed proportion of productionis positively related in a statis-
tically significant way to production level even in the case of the
8The reason for fixing this limit is as follows. From the 15th
Round of National Sample Survey of comsumer expenditure data relating
to the year 1959-60, we note that the level of average annual foodgrain
consumption among the richer sections of the rural population (i.e. te
weighted averate for those with monthly per capita consumption expendi-
ture of at least Rs. 15) was about 7.5 maunds per capita and about 8.5
maunds per adult unit. Assuming that this approximates the average level
of grain consumption among the larger cultivators (with more than 10
acres) of Punjab and Uttar Pradesh, and adding to this approximate
figures for seekiwage payments in kind and livestock feed, one may regard
the figure of 15 maunds per adult unit as a rough indicator (probably
biased upward rather than downward) of the level of comfortable
retention of foodgrains by the better-off cultivating households.
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richer subsamples. The estimated output elasticity of marketed surplus
(net of the effects of the other variables) is around 1.7. The cross-
sectional price elasticity of marketed surplus, though still negative,
appears to be statistically less significant than in the case of the
general sample. Referring back to equation (IV), we may note that the
likelihood of obtaining a negative price elasticity of marketed surplus
declines as the income elasticity of demand for foodgrains and/or the
importance of foodgrains in total farm income becomes smaller. The
value of foodgrains production as a proportion of total income of culti-
vators from crops and livestock products is only slightly smaller for
the richer sample of Table A.2 than for the sample of Table A.1 (39%
as against 40%). But the income elasticity of demandfrom the available
National Sample Survey datalseems to be smaller for the upper income
classes than for all the income or expenditure classes put together.
This may give us a plausible explanation for the weaker negative price
elasticity obtained for the richer subsamples.
All this seems to indicate that at the present stage the agricul-
tural sector as a whole in countries like India may not necessarily
market more grains when grain price goes up, but this might be less of
a problem for relatively more prosperous regions or farmers. Needless
to mention, however, that our study is in terms of a very simplified
framework and carried out on the basis of evidence with regards to a
specific region; for settling this important policy problem in economic
development one would need more conclusive evidence and more extensive
study.
Table A.1
Factors Affecting Marketed Surplus as a Proportion of Production
of Foodgrains (Y) in 27 Villages of Uttar Pradesh and Punjab
Name of Reference Y X X3 5 6
Village Year
Rataul Rohe 1955-56
Rataul Rohe 1960-61
Palanpur 1957-58
Saran 1954-55
Saran 1959-60
Dughri 1956-57
Mehtiana 1957-58
Rawatpur 1957-58
Sohalpur Gara 1954-55
Sohalpur Gara 1958-59
Walidpur 1958-59
Kukar Majra 1956-57
Koloyee 1957-58
Ghiana 1954-55
Patran 1957-58
Noorpur 1955-56
Naunera 1954-55
Shamaspur 1954-55
Meharwani 1954-55
Sochiana 1957-58
Lodi Nangal 1957-58
Bhatian 1960-61
Sarai Naga 1955-56
Kala Jhar 1956-57
Dhakia 1958-59
Arwah 1955-56
Akoi 1956-57
Bahautwas 1955-56
Bhautwas 1959-60
Bhunderi 1958-59
Bhojpur 1954-55
Arithmetic Mean
Source: Village Surveys by
45.5
36.8
12.9
18.0
13.9
20.9
22.4
24.7
33.2
26.2
11.4
28.2
17.1
29.2
40.8
30.4
46.7
9.6
38'.1
41.7
35.7
50.2
59.2
31.9
10.2
23.3
16.9
26.6
4.2
31.1
28.5
27.9
the Agricultural
27.4
30.7
5.5
17.6
15.1
16.3
12.0
8.3
13.4
13.1
10.1
19.9
8.8
18.3
28.5
11.6
24.7
9.1
10.4
28.9
30.5
20.7
49.5
21.3
7.8
11.9
20.1
8.3
3.2
11.4
11.5
17.03
Economics
12.73
14.01
15.23
8.64
16.08
14.00
14.61
12.34
10.63
12.47
17.44
14.92
15.63
9.80
10.89
11.67
6.49
10.83
11.14
12.82
11.24
14.44
15.11
13.07
17.86
8.34
13.75
6.91
14.14
10.29
12.15
12.55
Research
13.88
14.04
14.64
7.06
14.87
13.66
14.62
12.52
8.74
12.59
16.55
10.76
14.67
8.31
11.75
11.69
6.69
8.67
9.70
12.09
11.25
12.57
12.95
11.97
14.65
9.91
14.41
7.08
13.02
10.72
12.63
11.89
Centre at
1.16
2.08
0.77
1.01
1.20
2.73
2.36
1.15
1.31
1.72
6.25
2.62
1.81
3.41
1.52
0.99
1.62
0.74
2.04
1.85
1.88
7.12
10.76
2.79
1.19
0.50
3.09
0.35
0.51
1.22
0.77
2.21
2.79
1.45
0..63
2.58
1.16
1.14
0.70
0.46
0.81
0.54
0.80
1.45
0.73
0.68
1.21
0.95
1.41
0.35
1.11
1.39
1.40
0.70
2.12
1.68
0.22
0.46
1.78
0.46
0.26
0.44
0.20
1.03
0.485
0.397
0.459
0.310
0.262
0.190
0.230
0.375
0.214
0.328
0.508
0.254
0.922
0.355
0.150
0.377
0.385
0.228
0.256
0.455
0.142
0.458
0.195
0.410
0.290
0.325
0.364
0.517
0.448
0.205
0.19t
0.345
the University of Delhi
Note: 17 of these villages belong to the state of Punjab, and
10.3
11.3
12.2
11.7
14.4
20.3
22.6
14.7
7.0
13.6
17.8
20.6
19.8
17.4
16.3
29.9
14.7
28.1
21.4
28.1
28.7
10.0
0.0
19.2
9.1
18.4
12.3
6.1
8.4
15.4
12.4
15.88
10 to Uttar Pradesh.
Table A.2
Factors Affecting Marketed Surplus as a Proportion of Foodgrains
Production (Y) for Cultivators with Holdings > 10 acres, in 26
Villages of Uttar Pradesh and Punjab
Name of Y X X X' X X X
Village 1 2 2 3 4 6
Rataul Rohe I 47.6 43.3 12.73 12.18 1.59 3.61 10.4
Rataul Rohe II 39.0 57.6 14.02 13.58 3.97 2.28 13.4
Palanpur 13.7 12.6 14.78 14.82 1.91 0.89 16'4
Saran I 19.3 17.6 8.61 6.93 0.99 2.66 10.5
Mehtiana 36.5 14.1 14.60 14.63 3.20 0.97 10.5
Rawatpur 35.0 16.7 11.97 12.32 2.63 0.65 15.5
Walidpur 14.6 17.5 17.60 16.40 11.42 1.31 13.,
Kukar Majra 28.4 22.2 15.43 13.44 3.75 1.32 20.3
Koloyee 29.5 21.9 14.96 16.28 6.33 1.02 12.1
Patran 40.7 21.9 10.94 11.75 1.64 1.23 17.1
Noorpur 35.1 18.1 11.85 11.73 1.44 1.15 28.2
Sochiana I 50.4 42.0 12.96 12.31 2.42 1.44 20.0
Bhatian II 53.4 16.4 14.44 12.52 5.49 0.73 6.6
Sarai Naga 59.2 49.5 15.11 12.95 10.76 2.12 0.0
Kala Jhar 32.0 24.4 13.07 11.97 3.18 1.68 21.5
Akoi 17.4 28.1 13.76 14.39 4.39 2.29 12.7
Bahautwas I 26.7 12.4 7.02 5.56 0.72 0.45 7.2
Bahautwas II 6.0 5.0 14.22 13.89 0.76 0.26 6.4
Bhunderi 40.1 12.7 10.01 10.59 1.27 0.34 19.6
Bhojpur 25.9 13.5 13.06 13.64 1.43 0.49 19.5
Lodi Nangal 37.0 38.9 11.25 11.28 2.40 1.70 27.8
Shamaspur 11.3 11.5 10.97 8.70 0.95 0.45 32.7
Naunera 54.0 36.7 6.56 6.36 2.83 2.12 14.1
Sohalpur Gara I 34.0 32.0 9.84 8.72 4.04 1.06 7.0
Ghiana 29.2 21.6 9,79 8.29 3.99 1.03 16.0
Arwah 25.7 14.1 8.36 10.16 0.62 0.84 19.6
Meharwani 41.5 25.4 11.12 9.80 4.47 1.32 19.0
32.71 24.07 12.18 11.67 3.28Arithmetic Average 1.31 15.48
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NOTE TO TABLE A.2: For much of north-west India covering Punjab and
Uttar Pradesh, a cultivator with an operational holding of 10 acres or
more is considered to be beyond the stratum consisting of subsistence
peasants. Table A.2 presents the relevant data for the group of culti-
vators with operational holdings of 10 acres and above in each of the
villages. Four cases of Table A.l could not be included in this Table
because of inadequate breakdown of available data among different size-
classes; these cases are: Saran (1959-60), Sohalpur Gara (1958-59),
Dughri and Dhakia.
A household with an annual income of about Rs.1000 may be regarded
as above the subsistence minimum for the period under consideration
(i.e. the second half of the fifties). In many parts of Punjab and
U.P. a 10 acre holding may be expected to yield (under normal weather
conditions, and with the prices of the period) a net produce (i.e.,
net of all paid out costs of cultivation except rent) worth not much
less than Rs.1000. Farm Management Survey data for Punjab [9] shows
this net value of produce from an acre of land in two surveyed districts
to be very nearly Rs.100. This is corroborated by our analysis of net
value of produce per acre (in Table A.3) for the selected villages in
less than one fifth of which the net value of produce per acre at
current prices is significantly below Rs.100. In 5 cases of this Table,
viz., Saran, Meharwani, Arwah and Bahautwas (both surveys), a 10-
acre holding did not yield at least Rs.900-1000 of net farm income.
The norm for the above-subsistence income should perhaps change
with changes in the price conditions and with differing volume and
composition of consumption opportunities. A cultivator with, say,
Rs.700 of net farm income may not feel as badly placed in a remote,
backward village like Bahautwas or Arwah as he would in a prosperous
village situated near cities like the villages Sarai Naga or Kukar
Majra. From this point of view, it may be quite legitimate not to
exclude the 5 cases mentioned above from the sample of Table A.2.
Regressions (e) and (f) of Table 1 are based on all the 27 observations
listed in Table A.2, while regressions (g) and (h) are computed after
excluding 5 of them.
Table A.3
Net Value of Crop Production per Standard Acre
Villages of Uttar Pradesh and Punjab
in the Selected
Village Total Land Gross Cost (cash Net Value Net Value of
Cultivated Value of and kind) of of Crop Crop Production
(in Standard Production Cultivation Production per Acre
acres) (Rs.) (Rs.) (Rs.) (Rs.)
2 3 4 5 6
Rataul Rohe
(1955-56)*
Palanpur
Saran
Dughri
Mehtiana
Rawatpur
Sohalpur Gara
(1954-55)
Sohalpur Gara
(1958-59)
Walidpur
Kukar Majra
Koloyee
Ghiana
Patran
Noorpur
Naunera
Shamaspur
Meharwani
Sochiana
Lodi Nangal
Bhatian
Sarai Naga
Kala Jhar
Dhakia
Arwah
Akoi
Bahautwas
1037
465
1069
669
411
560
390
409
517
365
600
641
938
1085
597
- 64
587
390
382
441
1668
-875
548
936
667
1204
119363
63704
73146
149015
92398
103651
57246
91071
253583
114504
98770
137870
113095
165071
82134
34988
77170
91451
90770
174953
452532
193068
124295
67051
177857
60744
25888
9964
37652
37553
41862
22629
20052
23206
70156
19000
19822
79915
18375
62329
5850
12021
25800
17724
25130
108063
108850
78000
39274
5800
40819
5480
93375
53740
35494
111462
50536
81022
37194
67865
183427
95504
78948
57955
94720
102742
76284
22967
51370
74727
65941
66890
343682
115068
85021
62251
137038
55264
90.00
115.65
33.20
166.50
122.80
144.60
95.40
166.00
354.44
261.60
131.48
90.36
101.00
94.68
127.68
357.50
87.50
191.50
172. 0
151.60
206.00
131.50
155.00
66.50
205.44
45.90
t'3
Table A.3 (continued)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Bhunderi 393 71948 20005 51943 132.00
* All the necessary data for calculating net value of production per acre was not available for the second
point survey of Ratual Rohe. But from a consideration of production of crops and prices during the two
survey years, it seems that the net value of production per acre during the resurvey year was larger than
what it was during the initial year.
Note: Cost of cultivation in Column 4 covers the following items: cash and kind wage payments to permanent
and casual labourers (hired), cash and kind payments to artisans (like blacksmiths for repairing
implements, masons for repairing wells and other farm buildings), purchased seed, purchased fodder,
fertilizers and manures, irrigation charges, land revenue and panchayat taxes (if any), oil for
tractors, pumps, etc. The item that is excluded is rent paid by the cultivators. The reason for
doing this is as follows. Rent payment has to be deducted (from gross produce) in calculating the net
income of an individual cultivator. But when it comes to finding out the net value of produce from an
acre of land in a village, rent may be treated more as an item in the distribution of net produce
as between cultivators and non-cultivating land owners.
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